Another Thought

So I've started Jonathan Edwards's Freedom of the Will here recently and wanted to just comment on one thing. The first few pages are his defining the term "will" with regards to John Locke's definition of the word "will." Locke says that will and desire can run counter to one another, as they are distinguishable from one another. Edwards takes it one step further. Will and desire are not necessarily distinguishable from one another, as desire is rather a part of the will, and therefore cannot run counter to one another in Locke's sense. "...'will' seems to be a word of a more general signification, extending to things present and absent. 'Desire' respects something absent."

Let me preface my next idea: First, I don't necessarily disagree with Edwards. Second, my thoughts are impromptu, after just a couple of readings of the text. Third, I'm not as smart as he is.

Okay, so I feel (like Edwards) will and desire never run contrary to each other. I desire the cookie. I will not eat the cookie (for whatever reason; health, money, etc.). However, my will is still a product of my final desire, that being I will not eat the cookie because, though a part of me wants to eat it, a larger part of me does not want to eat it, even if that part of me is motivated ulteriorly. So I think what Locke was getting at is that there are different kinds of desires within our minds, all with different reaches of influence (resulting from a level of discipline); and I think what Edwards was getting at is that all of these work together to form our will.

I could have that wrong, but I'll go with it for now.

But I'm afraid I'm nuking the fridge.

But not to dwell any longer on this, whether desire and will, and whether preference and volition be precisely the same things or no; yet, I trust it will be allowed by all, that in every act of will there is an act of choice; that in every volition there is a preference, or a prevailing inclination of the soul, whereby the soul, at that instant, is out of a state of perfect indifference, with respect to the direct object of the volition. So that in every act, or going forth of the will, there is some preponderation of the mind or inclination, one way rather than another; and the soul had rather have or do one thing than another, or than not to have or do that thing; and that there, where there is absolutely no preferring or choosing, but a perfect continuing equilibrium, there is no volition.

I couldn't have said it any better myself Mr. Edwards. Let's move on.